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Abstract
In 1998 Massachusetts began state-sponsored, annual achievement testing
of all students in three public school grades. It has created a school and
district rating system for which scores on these tests are the sole factor. It
proposes to use tenth-grade test scores as a sole criterion for high school
graduation, beginning with the class of 2003. The state is treating scores
and ratings as though they were precise educational measures of high
significance. A review of tenth-grade mathematics test scores from
academic high schools in metropolitan Boston showed that statistically
they are not. Community income is strongly correlated with test scores and
accounted for more than 80 percent of the variance in average scores for a
sample of Boston-area communities:
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Once community income was included in models, other factors--including
percentages of students in disadvantaged populations, (Note 1) percentages
receiving special education, percentages eligible for free or reduced price
lunch, percentages with limited English proficiency, school sizes, school
spending levels, and property values--all failed to associate substantial
additional variance. Large uncertainties in residuals of school-averaged
scores, after subtracting predictions based on community income, tend to
make the scores ineffective for rating performance of schools. Large
uncertainties in year-to-year score changes tend to make the score changes
ineffective for measuring performance trends.
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Section 1: Background
A. State Testing in Massachusetts Public Schools
The most recent form of state testing in Massachusetts public schools is the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), a set of achievement tests
sponsored and produced by the Massachusetts Department of Education and
administered in the spring of years beginning in 1998 (see Appendix 1 and Bolon, 2000). 
These tests have four sections: English language arts, mathematics, science and
technology, and history and social science. For the years 1998-2000, tests were
administered in grades 4, 8 and 10. Beginning in April, 2001, the former grade 4 test
sections were divided between grades 4 and 5; new tests have been added in grades 3, 6
and 7.
MCAS tests are loosely timed and include questions in multiple choice, short answer and
extended answer formats; they are provided in English and Spanish. All public school
students are required to take MCAS tests; there are no "opt-out" provisions. Students
taught in parochial schools, other private schools, home schooling and out-of-state
schools are not required to take or pass MCAS. For 1998 through 2000, the Department
of Education has published test questions used for scoring approximately six months
after test administration (see Mass. DoE, 2000g, for example). It has produced new test 
forms each year. According to current plans, starting with the class of 2003 minimum
scores on the English language arts and mathematics sections will be required to graduate
from high school (Mass. DoE, 1999f) and to enroll at state colleges, except for MCAS
test preparation courses at two-year colleges.
The Massachusetts Department of Education publishes MCAS results as scaled scores in
a range of 81 scale points, using the integers 200 through 280 (Mass. DoE, 2000h). The 
Department assigns labels it calls "performance levels" to four scaled score intervals
(Mass. DoE, 1998b) and currently considers 220 the minimum passing scaled score on
all test sections (Mass. DoE, 1999f). The Department has not fully disclosed details of
assigning scale factors, assuring consistent scores across test forms or assuring that
scores quantitatively reflect published academic standards. It has not published
distributions of either raw scores or scaled scores. It has released limited information
about test design and properties in "technical reports" for the years 1998 (Mass. DoE,
1999c) and 1999 (Mass. DoE, 2000i). After an independent analysis of score averages by
"racial" and "ethnic" categories for 1998 (Uriarte and Chavez, 1999), the Department
published its own analysis of this type for 1999 (Mass. DoE, 2000c).
Massachusetts tests appear to rank near the high end of state achievement tests in
difficulty, although failure rates are lower than those for some tests used in Arizona and
Virginia. As in several other states, substantially higher failure rates are found on
mathematics than on language tests in high schools. Since the tenth-grade version of the
mathematics test section sets the graduation threshold for most students, its scores have
been used as subjects for these studies.
B. Schools in the Boston Metropolitan Area
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Metropolitan Boston is diverse. Besides the City of Boston it includes many smaller
municipalities, all operating their own school systems. These studies consider
communities inside Route 128, a highway designed in the late 1940s (now an Interstate),
enclosing areas within about 9-12 miles from Boston's government center--that is,
Boston and its inner and middle suburbs. They share a public transit system, several
public and private utilities, and an economy dominated by service industries. They
include poverty areas, concentrations of wealth, middle-income communities, prosperous
suburban towns, a few medium-sized cities and one large city. The areas are bounded by
the Massachusetts Bay and Atlantic Ocean to the east, Salem and Peabody to the north,
Waltham and Newton to the west, and Braintree and Quincy to the south (see
Metropolitan Area, 1997).
Schools in the Boston metropolitan area are also diverse. These studies, focusing on
testing for graduation, consider only high schools. While a majority of the area's
population of high-school age attends public schools, (Note 2) a substantial proportion
attends parochial schools that began to be established by the Roman Catholic Church
more than 150 years ago. A smaller fraction is taught in other private schools or though
home schooling. The Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunities (METCO),
founded in 1963, uses state funding to help send over 3,000 Boston minority students to
suburban schools (Orfield, et al., 1997).
Within public school systems there is also substantial diversity. All communities must
support regional "vocational," "technical" and "agricultural" high schools. Some such
schools began as "manual training" schools in the 1800s. Some communities have closed
their local vocational schools; some have merged them with their academic schools.
These studies look in detail only at academic schools, because the curriculum of
vocational schools is substantially different and is not designed to prepare students for
MCAS tests, an issue of controversy (Nicodemus, 2000). For purposes of these studies 
there are difficulties with a few communities, including Cambridge, Quincy, Revere and
Waltham, which provide vocational education in the same facilities as academic
programs (Mass. DoE, 2000f). I chose to include such schools in these studies while
noting their special characteristics.
Several communities also operate experimental schools, including "pilot schools" in
Boston and "charter schools" in several communities (Partee, 1997, and Wood, 1999), as 
regulated under the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993. All that offer
ninth-grade curriculum and above are smaller than the regular academic schools. These
schools provide motivational environments and may exercise indirect forms of student
selection that differentiate them from other public schools. Primarily because of concerns
about small sample sizes, schools with fewer than 100 students per grade are excluded
from these studies. So far no experimental school is that large.
The City of Boston presents a unique situation. Of its large academic high schools, three
are exam schools: the Boston Latin School (founded in 1635) and the more recent Latin
Academy (formerly Girls Latin) and O'Bryant School of Mathematics and Science
(formerly Boston Technical). These draw away many Boston students who tend to score
well on achievement tests, promoting a longstanding social stratification in Boston
schools. Over half the students at Boston Latin come to it from parochial and other
private schools (Daley, 1997); some say those students would not otherwise attend
Boston schools. However, other public school students who are not admitted leave the
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district for high school. Starting in 1975, because of federal court orders to desegregate,
exam school admission policies included a 35 percent set-aside for African American
and Latino students, maintained voluntarily after 1987. As a result of another federal
court decision (McLaughlin, 1996), this approach was weakened in 1997. As with
academic schools that provide vocational education, the Boston exam schools are
included in these studies, but their special characteristics are noted.
C. Statewide MCAS Test Results
Table 1-1 shows that statewide, tenth-grade MCAS test scores have remained nearly
constant in English language arts and in science and technology for the years 1998-2000,
while scores in mathematics have risen substantially (Mass. DoE, 2000h). (Tenth-grade 
tests were not given in history and social science.)
Table 1-1
MCAS Statewide Results, 1998-2000
Section Year Average % Level 4 % Level 3 % Level 2 % Level 1
English 2000 229 7 29 30 34
English 1999 229 4 30 34 32
English 1998 230 5 33 34 28
Math. 2000 228 15 18 22 45
Math. 1999 222 9 15 23 53
Math. 1998 222 7 17 24 52
Science 2000 226 3 23 37 37
Science 1999 226 3 21 39 38
Science 1998 225 1 21 42 36
Source of data: Mass. DoE, 2000h
Table 1-1 reflects Massachusetts Department of Education practice of recording students
absent for a test section as scoring 200 and in Level 1, the lowest level (Mass. DoE, 
2000h, Table 11 footnote). An undisclosed fraction of students were excluded from
testing because of special conditions and are not counted in this report; others may have
been provided with an alternative assessment. As currently planned, students in Level 1
will be ineligible to graduate from high school as of 2003. Based on this record of scores,
about half of all Massachusetts public school students are at risk of being denied
graduation.
The labels of the four "performance levels" designated by the 1998 Board of
Education(Note 3) for reporting MCAS results are:
Level 4, "Advanced"
Level 3, "Proficient"
Level 2, "Needs Improvement"
Level 1, "Failing"
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Although these levels have qualitative descriptions (Mass. DoE, 1998b), there are no 
quantitative links to levels of achievement specified in academic standards; content of
standards has not been prioritized; nor have standards been promulgated through state
regulations, as anticipated by law. (Note 4) Although Massachusetts law requires
"competency determination" in mathematics, science and technology, history and social
science, foreign languages and English, (Note 5) Massachusetts laws and regulations
continue to require only US history and physical education as subjects of instruction.
Massachusetts tries to set legal standards for learning indirectly (Note 6) through MCAS 
tests, procedures to set scale factors, and regulations for minimum scaled scores. It lacks
corresponding legal commitments for instruction. It has made major changes to
"curriculum frameworks" every few years (Mass. DoE, 2000k) and has not provided
reasonable spans of time for instruction to catch up before using revised "curriculum
frameworks" as a basis for revised MCAS tests. Its teachers, parents and students cannot
find out exactly what must be learned in order to meet minimum standards for high
school graduation. The 1993 Education Reform Act left several such problems; few have
been addressed yet by the Massachusetts legislature or Board of Education.
Students with disabilities (also called special education students) and students with
limited English proficiency (LEP students) tend to receive drastically lower MCAS
scores than other students, although some students with disabilities are soon to be
provided alternate assessments (Mass. DoE, 2000l), and some LEP students have been 
able to take tests in Spanish (Mass. DoE, 2000d). The Department of Education has not
disclosed the fractions of students who are eligible for or have utilized its special
accommodations, although it has published statewide summary data using these student
categories (Mass. DoE, 2000i, Table 14.5). Most minority students also receive lower
scores than other students. The Department of Education has published 1999 statewide
and district summary data for students categorized as "African American / Black," "Asian
or Pacific Islander," "Hispanic / Latino," "Native American," "White" and "Mixed"
(Mass. DoE, 2000c, Tables 5-10). As previously noted, most students in vocational
programs receive lower MCAS scores than students in academic programs; this can
readily be shown for the state's more than 30 vocational, technical and agricultural high
schools (Appendix 2).
Based on the sources of information cited, Table 1-2 shows statewide impacts of these
known risk factors on average 1999 tenth-grade mathematics scores and rates of failure.
Table 1-2
MCAS 1999 Grade 10 Math Scores by Risk Factors
Category Average Score Percent Failing
All students 222 53
Students with disabilities 203 92
Limited English proficiency 206 84
African American 209 80
Hispanic / Latino 208 85
Native American 211 77
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Vocational, technical, agricultural 210 78
Source of data: Mass. DoE, 2000i
The Department of Education has not reported scores classified by other potential risk
factors on which it collects information. These include: Gender of students, Tests taken
in Spanish or as alternate assessments, Free or reduced price lunches, as indicators of
poverty, Schools with large class sizes, especially in early grades, Students retained
below grade or placed below grade level, Teachers who lack certification in their subjects
of instruction.
There is also little published information about combinations of risk factors. However,
since the Department of Education lists regional vocational, technical and agricultural
schools as separate districts in its reports of MCAS results, it is possible to use their
categories of minority students (Appendix 2). For those schools for which categories are
reported, results are shown in Table 1-3.
Table 1-3
MCAS 1999 Grade 10 Math Scores by Combined Risk Factors
Combined Category Average Score Percent Failing
Vocational + African American 203 97
Vocational + Hispanic / Latino 205 95
Sources of data: Mass. DoE, 2000i, Mass. DoE, 2000h
While the results in Table 1-3 are not strictly comparable with Table 1-2, because not all 
the schools and categories can be found in published data, they indicate that factors can
combine to worsen the scores of students with more than one risk factor.
D. Test Score Studies
Recent studies question assumptions that "high-stakes" tests like MCAS can provide
valid measures of either student achievement or school performance, showing gains on
them that are not matched by gains on other tests for closely related educational content
(Haney, 2000, and Klein, et al., 2000). Political environments of "high-stakes" tests
create heavy pressure to improve scores, regardless of underlying educational progress.
For "low-stakes" tests aimed at measuring long-term trends, like those of the federal
NAEP, it has been shown that "family variables explain most of the variance across
scores in states" (Grissmer, et al., 2000, Chapter 9). Individual and longitudinal studies
demonstrate strong influences of parenting practices, family structure, parent education
and degrees of poverty on cognitive development (for example, Smith, et al., 1997). 
Other longitudinal and cross-sectional studies show cumulative responses of test scores
to educational environments (for example, Phillips, et al., 1998, and Ferguson, 1998). 
However, the data generally available for test score research fail to capture much of the
critical information needed to understand development of cognitive abilities and
educational achievement in the settings of public schools.
MCAS test scores have already been the subject of several attempts to explain, predict or
interpret them (Mass. DoE, 2001, Gaudet, 2001, Tuerck, 2001a, and Tuerck, 2001b). 
These prior MCAS test score studies fall into three main categories: 1) Trends studies of
year-to-year and multi-year changes; 2) Effects studies involving social factors for the
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population; 3) Effects studies involving operating factors for the schools.
Research on scores from school-based standard tests suggests that many such studies are
likely to yield results of low significance. Grissmer, et al., 2000, among others, show
that:
Real year-to-year changes in average student performance, as assessed by
conventional tests, are relatively small; they can easily be masked by statistical
uncertainties.
Social factors are strongly associated with test scores.
Self-reported social information tends to have high error and omission rates.
Census and other community-based social information often includes confounding
factors that require adjustment to reflect the households for a school population.
Uncategorized school spending is only weakly associated with test scores.
The MCAS test score studies cited use scores and statistical data to estimate the
performance of schools or districts according to simple formulas, unsupported by other
evidence. They frequently present results in a table that is ranked or can be ranked like
the teams in a sports league. The "league table" approach to presenting such results begs
the question of whether the ordering of schools or districts and the differences in
performance estimates have educational significance, that is, whether such rankings may
instead be largely matters of chance or be associations with factors other than school
performance. This article presents a trends study and an effects study I conducted to
explore the significance that can be associated with such results.
E. Sources of Data
The school characteristics used in these studies are taken from information reported by
public schools to the Massachusetts Department of Education for 1999 and published by
the Department (Mass. DoE, 2000f). MCAS test scores summarized by schools are from
1998-2000 Department reports (Mass. DoE, 2000h). Other information is published by
the Department for school districts, including program budgets and percentages of
special education students. Information for census tracts and communities is available
from the US Bureau of the Census and other sources. Data analysis for these studies
focuses on information associated with individual schools because aggregate information
for school districts or general populations can mask school characteristics. Data used in
these studies are reproduced in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4; interested readers can
confirm them at the sources and can repeat these studies or perform other analysis with
them.
The Department of Education and the school districts collect other potentially useful
information that is not currently published. Of particular interest are data on class size
and teacher preparation. Recent research has shown significant association of educational
achievement as measured by "low-stakes" tests with small class size in elementary
schools (Nye, et al., 1999, and Krueger, 1999) and with teacher certification and
education (Darling-Hammond, 2000), after adjustments for student backgrounds. Studies
of the development of cognitive abilities cast doubt on whether other information
currently published by government sources about population and economic
characteristics in large geographical areas would substantially improve the understanding
of test scores.
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A. Trends Study of Variability
This study considers 47 academic high schools in 32 metropolitan Boston communities
through the average tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores recorded for years
1998-2000. Achievement tests in mathematics typically require substantial skill at
language interpretation (see, for example, Gipps and Murphy, 1994, Chapter 6, p. 183). 
Haney, 2000, in a study of another state, found stronger correlations of state mathematics
test scores with grades in English than with grades in math. As previously noted, the
tenth-grade mathematics test is used in this study of significance because it sets a 
graduation threshold for most students.
Test boycotts have been organized by students in several schools each year (Steinberg, 
2000), involving 10 to 31 percent of students in 19 cases out of the 141 test samples. To
be able to compare average scores of schools more accurately, the average scores
reported by the Department of Education have been adjusted by removing the scores of
200 that were assigned to students who did not take the test, averaging only scores of
students who participated.
Table 2-1 shows changes in schools' average scores (Appendix 3) between 1998 and
1999 and between 1999 and 2000, expressed in units of scale points and of standard
deviations.
Table 2-1
MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Score Changes by School, 1998-2000
Changes 1998-1999 Changes 1999-2000
City or Town High School Points Delta Points Delta
Arlington Arlington 4 3 5 -1
Belmont Belmont -2 -4 4 -2
Boston Boston High 1 0 6 0
Boston Brighton 2 1 3 -4
Boston Charlestown -1 -2 4 -2
Boston Dorchester -2 -3 1 -5
Boston East Boston 1 0 5 -1
Boston Hyde Park 0 -1 1 -5
Boston Jeremiah Burke 4 3 3 -3
Boston South Boston 0 -1 5 -1
Boston The English High 1 0 4 -2
Boston West Roxbury 3 2 5 -1
Boston Exam Boston Latin 8 10 8 3
Boston Exam Latin Academy 3 2 19 17
Boston Exam O'Bryant Science 4 4 8 3
Braintree Braintree -1 -3 13 10
Brookline Brookline 2 1 5 -1
Cambridge Rindge & Latin* -2 -5 -1 -10
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Table 2-5
Factor Correlations for MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor A B C D E F G
A. School population, average per grade 1.00 -.11 .24 .02 -.03 -.01 .16
B. Percent African American -.11 1.00 .07 .56 .80 .80 .28
C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander .24 .07 1.00 .08 .13 .23 .27
D. Percent Hispanic / Latino .02 .56 .08 1.00 .77 .84 .65
E. Percent limited English proficiency -.03 .80 .13 .77 1.00 .88 .50
F. Percent free or reduced price lunch -.01 .80 .23 .84 .88 1.00 .60
G. Percent reduction, grades 9+10 to 11+12 .16 .28 .27 .65 .50 .60 1.00
Sources of data: Appendix 4, Statistica model
Some of the correlations in Table 2-5 are strong enough that multiple regression
coefficients are likely to be unstable. Therefore a model was developed in stages,
examining factors for significance.
The full model from the factors in Table 2-4 was first evaluated with weights
proportional to numbers of test participants. It yielded two strong factors with low
correlation (C and E): "Percent Asian or Pacific Islander" at p<.02, with a positive 
coefficient, and "Percent limited English proficiency" at p<.002, with a negative
coefficient: Factors for school population and percent grade reduction had particularly
small coefficients and low significance. They were removed, and a model with the
remaining five factors then associated 67 percent of the variance and produced the factor
weights shown in Table 2-6.
Table 2-6
5-Factor Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 229.4 1.936
B. Percent African American 0.047 0.104
C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander 0.347 0.154
D. Percent Hispanic / Latino -0.002 0.183
E. Percent limited English proficiency -0.637 0.217
F. Percent free or reduced price lunch -0.174 0.157
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
With model factors in Table 2-6, high factor weight and significance found in other
studies for percentages of African American or Latino students disappear. Both factors
have small coefficients and low significance. Statistical weight that might have been
attached to these factors instead follows cultural and economic factors: "Percent limited
English proficiency" and "Percent free or reduced price lunch." As an experiment, the
model was rerun with the latter factors removed; only 57 percent of the variance was
associated, and factor weights became those shown in Table 2-7.
11 of 57
Table 2-7
Racial and Ethnic Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 230.0 2.107
B. Percent African American* -0.221 0.068
C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander 0.219 0.156
D. Percent Hispanic / Latino* -0.435 0.114
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
In Table 2-7, two "racial" or "ethnic" factors (marked *) have become significant at a
p<.05 level. The coefficient for "Percent African American" has turned from positive to
negative, and the coefficient for "Percent Hispanic / Latino" has become strongly
negative. It seems likely that these two factors are acting as proxies for cultural and
economic factors with more predictive power.
Residuals from the five-factor model of Table 2-6 are shown in Table 2-8. This include 
standard error estimates based on results from the trends study of Section 2A.
Table 2-8
Residuals for MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores, 5-Factor Model
City or Town High School Residual Std. Error Ratio
Arlington Arlington 4.6 2.6 1.8
Belmont Belmont 12.2 2.7 4.5
Boston Boston High -8.9 5.1 -1.7
Boston Brighton 1.7 3.3 0.5
Boston Charlestown 1.0 4.8 0.2
Boston Dorchester -1.6 4.3 -0.4
Boston East Boston 2.1 4.2 0.5
Boston Hyde Park -6.1 4.8 -1.3
Boston Jeremiah Burke 4.1 5.0 0.8
Boston South Boston -8.6 3.7 -2.3
Boston The English High 11.4 5.0 2.3
Boston West Roxbury 1.2 3.9 0.3
Boston Exam Boston Latin 21.3 3.5 6.0
Boston Exam Latin Academy 4.0 4.1 1.0
Boston Exam O'Bryant Science 4.65 4.3 1.1
Braintree Braintree -1.78 2.5 -0.7
Brookline Brookline 9.5 2.3 4.1
Cambridge Rindge & Latin* -6.3 4.0 -1.6
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Chelsea Chelsea 2.2 7.0 0.3
Dedham Dedham -1.6 3.1 -0.5
Everett Everett* -2.8 2.6 -1.1
Lexington Lexington 4.4 2.8 1.6
Lynn Classical -6.5 3.3 -2.0
Lynn English -5.0 3.9 -1.3
Malden Malden -6.6 3.2 -2.1
Marblehead Marblehead 3.4 3.2 1.1
Medford Medford* -7.4 2.7 -2.7
Melrose Melrose -2.7 2.7 -1.0
Milton Milton -1.7 3.1 -0.6
Newton North* 8.6 2.3 3.7
Newton South 10.0 2.8 3.6
Peabody Veterans* -7.2 2.5 -2.9
Quincy North Quincy -9.2 3.6 -2.5
Quincy Quincy* -14.1 3.1 -4.5
Revere Revere* -10.3 2.7 -3.9
Salem Salem* -1.5 3.1 -0.5
Saugus Saugus -2.8 2.9 -1.0
Somerville Somerville* 2.7 4.7 0.6
Stoneham Stoneham -1.7 3.1 -0.5
Swampscott Swampscott 11.8 3.2 3.7
Wakefield Memorial -2.0 2.8 -0.7
Waltham Waltham* -7.4 2.6 -2.8
Watertown Watertown 4.7 3.1 1.5
Weymouth Weymouth* -7.0 2.3 -3.0
Winchester Winchester 12.5 2.9 4.4
Winthrop Winthrop* -5.5 3.5 -1.6
Woburn Woburn -1.9 2.6 -0.7
* school providing vocational education
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
At first glance, some residuals in Table 2-8 look substantial, several scale points of
difference from the average scores predicted by the model. However, residual ratios for
most schools are within +/- 2 standard errors, not significant at a p<.05 level. Someone 
familiar with metropolitan Boston will recognize that schools with high and low residual
ratios tend to be in high-income and low-income communities, respectively. It therefore
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seems likely that adding a factor for incomes can increase the predictive power of the
model.
The most recent community income data were from the US Census of 1990, for 1989
per-capita income. Comparable 1999 income statistics were not yet available. The
Massachusetts Department of Revenue could produce current community income
statistics but has not done so; the state continues to use 1989 federal census data on
incomes to apportion aid to public schools. After adding 1989 per-capita community
income in $1,000s as a factor (Mass. DoR, 1999), without any attempt to adjust incomes
so as to reflect school districts or student households, the model associates 80 percent of
the statistical variance, and factor weights became those shown in Table 2-9.
Table 2-9
6-Factor Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 202.7 5.400
B. Percent African American -0.020 0.083
C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander* 0.371 0.121
D. Percent Hispanic / Latino 0.044 0.144
E. Percent limited English proficiency* -0.695 0.171
F. Percent free or reduced price lunch 0.050 0.131
H. Per-capita community income (1989)* 1.186 0.230
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
Three factors in Table 2-9 (marked *) have substantial significance, at a p<.005 level or 
better, and three have very low significance. Factor weight has shifted from "Percent free
or reduced price lunch" to "Per-capita community income (1989)," while "Percent limited
English proficiency" retains a large coefficient and high significance. Dropping
low-significance factors, the resulting three-factor model is shown in Table 2-10.
Table 2-10
3-Factor Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 204.9 4.446
C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander 0.381 0.109
E. Percent limited English proficiency -0.626 0.081
H. Per-capita community income (1989) 1.104 0.197
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
The three-factor model of Table 2-10 also associates 80 percent of the statistical variance.
All of its factors are statistically significant at a p<.001 level.
For each school included in these studies, Table 2-11 presents adjusted average 1999
tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores and residuals from the three-factor statistical
model of Table 2-10, with the uncertainties in average scores and residuals expressed as
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standard errors, based on the variance estimate calculated in the trends study of Section 
2A.
Table 2-11
Residuals for MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores, 3-Factor Model
City or Town High School Average Std. Error Residual Std. Error
Arlington Arlington 234 2.1 4.2 2.4
Belmont Belmont 243 2.2 6.7 2.7
Boston Boston High 204 2.9 -10.3 3.1
Boston Brighton 205 2.2 -0.1 2.9
Boston Charlestown 206 2.7 -1.6 3.7
Boston Dorchester 204 3.0 -0.5 3.5
Boston East Boston 205 2.3 -1.0 2.9
Boston Hyde Park 203 3.3 -5.0 3.7
Boston Jeremiah Burke 208 2.7 5.1 3.4
Boston South Boston 205 2.6 -7.8 3.1
Boston The English High 204 2.3 9.7 3.7
Boston West Roxbury 205 2.0 0.0 2.7
Boston Exam Boston Latin 254 1.7 23.6 2.7
Boston Exam Latin Academy 233 2.1 5.0 2.8
Boston Exam O'Bryant Science 227 2.1 4.3 3.4
Braintree Braintree 228 1.9 1.7 2.3
Brookline Brookline 240 1.6 -0.5 2.7
Cambridge Rindge & Latin* 220 1.6 -4.9 1.8
Chelsea Chelsea 216 2.3 3.7 2.8
Dedham Dedham 227 2.5 1.3 2.8
Everett Everett* 221 1.9 2.3 2.5
Lexington Lexington 238 1.7 -5.8 3.0
Lynn Classical 216 2.0 -3.3 2.8
Lynn English 213 2.1 0.9 2.5
Malden Malden 221 2.0 -2.8 2.6
Marblehead Marblehead 232 2.7 -6.3 3.6
Medford Medford* 221 2.2 -2.3 2.5
Melrose Melrose 226 2.1 -1.2 2.5
Milton Milton 228 2.3 -2.0 2.6
Newton North* 239 1.5 0.8 2.5
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Newton South 242 2.0 2.2 2.8
Peabody Veterans* 220 1.8 -2.9 2.3
Quincy North Quincy 227 1.9 -7.2 3.0
Quincy Quincy* 212 2.3 -11.9 2.6
Revere Revere* 218 1.9 -6.1 2.4
Salem Salem* 220 2.1 0.7 2.5
Saugus Saugus 226 2.2 0.8 2.6
Somerville Somerville* 216 1.8 1.7 2.1
Stoneham Stoneham 227 2.5 1.5 2.9
Swampscott Swampscott 240 2.6 7.6 3.0
Wakefield Memorial 227 2.2 0.6 2.6
Waltham Waltham* 220 1.8 -4.0 2.1
Watertown Watertown 231 2.6 4.3 2.8
Weymouth Weymouth* 222 1.5 -3.8 2.1
Winchester Winchester 243 2.3 2.8 3.2
Winthrop Winthrop* 223 3.0 -1.4 3.3
Woburn Woburn 226 2.0 1.3 2.4
* school providing vocational education
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
Stepwise analysis shows that combinations of the factors in the three-factor model of
Table 2-10 associate statistical variance in the amounts listed in Table 2-12.
Table 2-12
Factor Combinations for 1999 MCAS 
Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factors R2
C .01
E .62
H .47
C E .65
C H .52
E H .74
C E H .80
C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander
E. Percent limited English proficiency
H. Per-capita community income (1989)
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Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
Table 2-12 shows that the major factors are "Percent limited English proficiency" and
"Per-capita community income (1989)." Although statistically significant, "Percent Asian
or Pacific Islander" is a weak cofactor, associating only 1 percent of the variance by itself.
The three-factor model of Table 2-10 was evaluated for predictions of 1998 and 2000
average test scores. It was not expected to perform as well, since most factor data were
for 1999. However, the factor weights and significance proved robust, and the model
associated statistical variance as shown in Table 2-13.
Table 2-13
Year Comparisons for MCAS 
Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Year R2
1998 .83
1999 .80
2000 .77
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
The residuals in Table 2-11 suggest systematic contributions to test score averages at
some schools that might have been produced by unusual efforts. Probable outliers for the
predictive model with correspondingly large year-to-year average score changes had a
strongly positive bias: those for Boston Latin, Latin Academy and Swampscott.
Model behavior for metropolitan Boston schools may be biased by special characteristics
of City of Boston schools, because the students who score well on school-based standard
tests are selected for admission to the three exam schools. (Note 9) Current data also
attribute average Boston per-capita income equally to all school districts instead of
adjusting by districts or census tracts. The Boston cross-enrollment and busing programs
would complicate an income analysis. Behavior of the three-factor model of Table 2-10
was examined for 1999 tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores, considering only
schools outside the City of Boston. These 34 schools had a 1999 total population per
grade of about 10,200 students out of 13,730 for all schools considered in these studies.
When applied only to schools outside the City of Boston, the three-factor model of Table 
2-10 showed significance at the p<.05 level for "Percent limited English proficiency" and
"Per-capita community income (1989)" but not for "Percent Asian or Pacific Islander." A
two-factor model based on the first two of these factors, with schools weighted by
numbers of test participants, associates 86 percent of the statistical variance. Factor
weights became as shown in Table 2-14.
Table 2-14
2-Factor Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 201.5 2.934
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E. Percent limited English proficiency -0.325 0.136
H. Per-capita community income (1989) 1.307 0.126
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
Several trial factors were added individually to the two-factor model of Table 2-14, but 
none showed statistical significance at the p<.05 level. The statistical variance associated
when each trial factor was added to this two-factor model is shown in Table 2-15.
Table 2-15
Factor Comparison for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
R2 Trial Factor Added
.86 None
.88 A. Population per grade
.88 B. Percent African American
.86 C. Percent Asian or Pacific Islander
.86 D. Percent Hispanic / Latino
.87 F. Percent free or reduced price lunch
.87 G. Percent reduction, grades 9+10 to 11+12
.87 Percent special education
.86 Per-capita property value, 1998, $000s
.88 Spending, regular education, $000s
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
The last three trial factors in Table 2-15 are districtaverages; the last and third from last
are for all schools in all grades. Three districts, Lynn, Newton and Quincy, each operate
two academic high schools which will not be distinguished by these factors. Outside the
City of Boston, only "community income" and "limited English proficiency" are
significant contributors to 1999 tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores; their
indicators are effective predictors.
A one-factor model, using only "Per-capita community income (1989)," performed
almost as well as any combination of factors shown in Table 2-15, associating 84 percent 
of the variance. The factor weight is in Table 2-16.
Table 2-16
1-Factor Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 197.0 2.395
H. Per-capita community income (1989) 1.465 0.114
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Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
"Percent limited English proficiency" is much less effective in a one-factor model,
associating only 38 percent of the variance. Community income appears to be the
dominant factor associated with these test scores. The 1999 adjusted average tenth-grade
MCAS mathematics test scores by school, plus residuals from the two-factor and
one-factor models for 1999, shown in Table 2-14 and Table 2-16, with standard error 
estimates for each, are in Table 2-17.
Table 2-17
Residuals for MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores, 1,2-Factor Models
City or
Town
High School Average
Score
Std.
Error
2-factor 
Residual
Std.
Error
1-factor 
Residual
Std.
Error
Arlington Arlington 234 2.1 4.7 2.2 5.6 2.2
Belmont Belmont 243 2.2 6.6 2.4 6.8 2.4
Braintree Braintree 228 1.9 2.3 2.1 3.7 2.0
Brookline Brookline 240 1.6 1.4 2.0 0.5 2.0
Cambridge Rindge& 
Latin*
220 1.6 -5.0 1.8 -6.1 1.8
Chelsea Chelsea 216 2.3 4.3 2.7 2.1 2.6
Dedham Dedham 227 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.1 2.6
Everett Everett* 221 1.9 2.6 2.1 3.2 2.2
Lexington Lexington 238 1.7 -3.3 2.2 -4.0 2.2
Lynn Classical 216 2.0 2.2 2.4 -0.1 2.2
Lynn English 213 2.1 1.0 2.9 -3.1 2.4
Malden Malden 221 2.0 2.2 2.2 0.9 2.1
Marblehead Marblehead 232 2.7 -9.2 3.0 -9.8 3.1
Medford Medford* 221 2.2 -1.7 2.3 -0.8 2.3
Melrose Melrose 226 2.1 -1.7 2.3 -0.6 2.2
Milton Milton 228 2.3 -2.6 2.4 -1.9 2.4
Newton North* 239 1.5 0.6 1.9 -0.2 1.9
Newton South 242 2.0 3.4 2.3 2.8 2.3
Peabody Veterans* 220 1.8 -3.1 2.0 -1.9 1.9
Quincy North 
Quincy
227 1.9 2.7 2.2 4.5 2.0
Quincy Quincy* 212 2.3 -9.4 2.5 -10.5 2.5
Revere Revere* 218 1.9 -1.3 2.1 -0.5 2.1
Salem Salem* 220 2.1 -0.4 2.3 -0.6 2.3
Saugus Saugus 226 2.2 1.2 2.4 3.0 2.3
Somerville Somerville* 216 1.8 -0.4 2.3 -3.2 2.0
Stoneham Stoneham 227 2.5 1.7 2.7 3.3 2.6
Swampscott Swampscott 240 2.6 5.5 2.7 5.6 2.8
Wakefield Memorial 227 2.2 0.7 2.4 2.2 2.3
Waltham Waltham* 220 1.8 -2.3 2.0 -1.6 2.0
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Watertown Watertown 231 2.6 3.8 2.7 4.2 2.7
Weymouth Weymouth* 222 1.5 -3.5 1.8 -1.9 1.7
Winchester Winchester 243 2.3 1.5 2.7 1.2 2.7
Winthrop Winthrop* 223 3.0 -1.3 3.2 -0.1 3.1
Woburn Woburn 226 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.4 2.1
* school providing vocational education
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
In an attempt to improve accuracy of the model in Table 2-14, schools with residuals
from the two-factor model for 1999 that were greater than two standard deviations were
dropped, Belmont with positive residual and Cambridge Rindge & Latin, Marblehead
High and Quincy High with negative residuals. The two-factor model for 1999 scores
then produced the factor weights shown in Table 2-18.
Table 2-18
2-Factor Trial for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 200.6 2.188
E. Percent limited English proficiency -0.216 0.101
H. Per-capita community income (1989) 1.357 0.095
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
Chi square for the two-factor model of Table 2-18 was 36.2 with 27 degrees of freedom
(p=.11). The one-factor model of Table 2-16 was also evaluated for 1999 with the set of
cases used in Table 2-18, producing the factor weights shown in Table 2-19.
Table 2-19
1-Factor Trial for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 197.6 1.793
H. Per-capita community income (1989) 1.463 0.087
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
Chi square for the one-factor model of Table 2-19 was 43.4 with 28 degrees of freedom
(p=.03). However, the cases and models from Table 2-18 and Table 2-19 did not provide 
significant chi square probabilities for 1998 or 2000 scores; all other attempts to improve
estimation by removing outliers also proved unstable.
Residuals from the two-factor model of Table 2-14 for schools outside the City of Boston
are strongly autocorrelated. The coefficient was .45 between 1998 and 1999 and .67
between 1999 and 2000. Scatterplots for successive years are shown in Figure 2-4 and 
Figure 2-5, comparing 1998 and 2000 residuals with 1999 residuals:
Figure 2-4: MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Score Residuals, 1998 versus 1999
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.
Figure 2-5: MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Score Residuals, 2000 versus 1999
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To the extent that a trend can be observed by applying the model of Table 2-14 to 
different years, it appears that schools scoring higher than predicted tend to increase
scores in successive years, and schools scoring lower than predicted tend to decrease
scores. Departures from model predictions are not all random. The two spans of years
available for analysis suggest a systematic trend that could stratify high-scoring and
low-scoring schools.
C. Observations
The trends and effects studies presented in Section 2A and Section 2B show how studies 
of these types tend to yield results with low statistical significance unless "something
unusual" is going on. In the cases of the 2000 tenth-grade mathematics test and of the high
scores and large increases at Boston Latin, Latin Academy and Swampscott, the studies do
indicate "something unusual," although they cannot tell what it is. They also illustrate that
commonly published "league tables" of scores strongly reflect social factors associated
with school populations, not factors clearly associated with school performance. The
effects study shows a robust, positive correlation of scores with household incomes, plus a
smaller, negative correlation with limited English proficiency. Factor weights and
statistical significance for other factors considered are small. School-based data are not
currently published for several potentially significant factors, such as class sizes in
elementary grades, mathematics course enrollments and levels of teacher preparation.
By far the strongest factor in predicting tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores is
"Per-capita community income (1989)." For the schools outside the City of Boston this
factor alone performed nearly as well as all available factors combined, associating 84
percent of the variance compared with 88 percent when all available factors were used.
The scatterplot in Figure 2-6 shows 1999 average scores for these schools versus 1989
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per-capita community income:
Figure 2-6: 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores versus Community Income
In Figure 2-6, the relation between school-averaged test scores and per-capita community
income looks linear over an income range of about 2½ to 1 for this set of schools. There is
no obvious threshold or saturation behavior. As it happens, spending on regular education
programs in school districts also varies over a range of about 2½ to 1 for those schools
(Mass. DoE, 2000f). However, there is only a weak relationship between 1999 spending
on regular education programs in those school districts and their 1999 tenth-grade MCAS
mathematics test scores, associating only about 3 percent of the variance and not
statistically significant at a p<.05 level, as shown in the scatterplot of Figure 2-7.
Figure 2-7: 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores versus School Spending
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Although a tendency for scores on school-based standard tests to rise with incomes has
been recognized in the US for more than 70 years (Bolon, 2000), there has been relatively 
little research on this phenomenon in ordinary income ranges, compared with the attention
given to associations between test scores and conditions of poverty or race. The strong,
apparently linear association of average test scores with community incomes shown here,
as contrasted with their weak association with school spending, calls for investigation but
is beyond the scope of this report. It seems likely that community incomes are providing
something beyond what school programs provide, but if so we cannot tell from these data
what it might be. Perhaps this effect should not be surprising, since most students spend
more than three-fourths their waking hours outside school.
The factor "Percent limited English proficiency" was the second strongest influence on
predicted test scores. (Note 10) Previous effects studies of MCAS scores might not have
shown this if they failed to utilize the entire variety of school-associated data available,
including "limited English proficiency," "racial" or "ethnic," and "free or reduced price
lunch" student categories. A hypothesis inviting study is that students classified with
"limited English proficiency" might receive mathematics instruction less relevant to
curriculum tested by MCAS than other students. Another hypothesis is that strengthening
English language instruction for "limited English proficient" students might improve their
MCAS mathematics test scores, provided all current efforts to teach mathematics and
other subjects are maintained. While statistical associations suggest these conjectures,
only observations and experiments could prove or disprove them.
Factors of "Percent African American" and "Percent Hispanic / Latino" did not make
significant contributions to school-averaged tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores
after other factors were introduced. Although "Percent Asian or Pacific Islander" retains
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statistical significance in certain models for some years, it is a much weaker factor than
"Per-capita community income (1989)" or "limited English proficiency." The latter
factors, and not "racial" or "ethnic" percentages, provide by far the strongest statistical
associations with school-averaged tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores in
metropolitan Boston. (Note 11)
Statistical significance of test-based ratings has been the principal focus of the studies.
Some studies developing or using such ratings do not provide an analysis of variability,
without which significance cannot be determined; or they estimate variability from single
test session reliability measurements, which were shown to be optimistic (for example,
Gaudet, 2001, and Tuerck, 2001a). The trends study in Section 2A of this report provides
evidence derived from tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores for larger variability
estimates.
D. Summary Analysis
My summary analysis is based on a one-factor model for metropolitan Boston
communities that each operate only a single academic high school, weighted by numbers 
of students tested. The effects study showed that "Per-capita community income (1989)"
was the dominant factor in predicting 1999 school-averaged tenth-grade MCAS
mathematics test scores. All other factors made only small contributions to predictions
with much lower significance. From published data, community income could not be
estimated reliably for each of the multiple academic high schools in Boston, Lynn,
Newton and Quincy. Reduction in scope leaves 28 high schools in the same number of
communities, with a total of about 8,200 students per grade recorded for 1999. Estimates
of uncertainties in school-averaged test scores are based on findings of the trends study,
which showed year-to-year variability of school-averaged scores several times greater than
the variability implied by conventional test reliability measurements. Plots of results
include uncertainty intervals (sometimes called "error bars") equivalent to +/- 1.4
estimated standard errors. When item intervals do not overlap, when standard errors have
been accurately estimated, and when items are uncorrelated, then differences between
items are significant at the p<.05 level. The one-factor model for 1999 with this set of
cases associated 82 percent of the variance and produced the factor weights shown in
Table 2-20.
Table 2-20
Community Income Model for 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores
Factor Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept, for all factors zero 198.4 2.667
Per-capita community income (1989) 1.397 0.129
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
The 1999 adjusted average tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores by school, plus
residuals from the foregoing one-factor model for 1999, with standard error estimates for
each, are shown in Table 2-21.
Table 2-21
Residuals for MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores, Income Model
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City or Town Average Score Std. Error 1-factor
Residual
Std. Error
Arlington 234 2.1 5.6 2.2
Belmont 243 2.2 7.1 2.5
Braintree 228 1.9 3.5 2.0
Brookline 240 1.6 1.0 2.1
Cambridge* 220 1.6 -6.2 1.8
Chelsea 216 2.3 1.4 2.6
Dedham 227 2.5 2.0 2.6
Everett* 221 1.9 2.7 2.2
Lexington 238 1.7 -3.4 2.3
Malden 221 2.0 0.5 2.2
Marblehead 232 2.7 -9.2 3.2
Medford* 221 2.2 -1.1 2.3
Melrose 226 2.1 -0.7 2.2
Milton 228 2.3 -1.8 2.4
Peabody* 220 1.8 -2.2 1.9
Revere* 218 1.9 -1.0 2.1
Salem* 220 2.1 -1.0 2.3
Saugus 226 2.2 2.7 2.3
Somerville* 216 1.8 -3.6 2.0
Stoneham 227 2.5 3.1 2.7
Swampscott 240 2.6 5.8 2.8
Wakefield 227 2.2 2.0 2.3
Waltham* 220 1.8 -1.9 2.0
Watertown 231 2.6 4.1 2.7
Weymouth* 222 1.5 -2.1 1.7
Winchester 243 2.3 1.8 2.8
Winthrop* 223 3.0 -0.4 3.1
Woburn 226 2.0 2.2 2.1
* school providing vocational education
Sources of data: Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Statistica model
The plot in Figure 2-8 shows school-averaged adjusted scores on the 1999 tenth-grade 
MCAS mathematics test and the corresponding uncertainty intervals (or "error bars"). In
this and the next two plots, the 28 schools considered in this summary analysis have been
rank-ordered from the lowest to the highest average scores on the 1999 tenth-grade
MCAS mathematics test.
Figure 2-8: Average 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores by School
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The plot in Figure 2-9 shows residuals for school-averaged 1999 tenth-grade MCAS
mathematics test scores, the differences left after subtracting away predictions calculated
from the factor "Per-capita community income (1989)."
Figure 2-9: Residuals of 1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores by School
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The picture in the plot of average scores of Figure 2-8, with significant separations
between high-scoring and low-scoring schools, is shown by the residuals plot of Figure 
2-9 to be associated largely with differences in community income. Chi square for the
residuals distribution is 63.2 with 27 degrees of freedom. After subtracting predictions
based on community income, residuals of average scores settle to just a little more than
statistical noise. Only five or six schools can be reliably distinguished other than by
community income.
The last plot, Figure 2-10, shows the changes in school-averaged 1999 tenth-grade MCAS
mathematics test scores from the same schools' average scores in 1998.
Figure 2-10: Changes in MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores by School, 1998-1999
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There was low statistical significance in year-to-year changes of the school-averaged
adjusted scores on tenth-grade MCAS mathematics tests between 1998 and 1999. The
distribution of changes about an average change of +1.2 scale points, as shown in Figure 
2-10, fits a normal distribution with weighted chi square of 22.7 for 26 degrees of freedom
(p = .65). Despite the possibility of little significance in score changes, such changes are
criteria by which the Massachusetts Department of Education has begun to rate school
Performance (Note 12) as "Failed to Meet Expectations," "Approached Expectations,"
"Met Expectations" or "Exceeded Expectations." There are severe penalties, including
state closure or seizure, for schools with low scores and ratings of "Failed to Meet
Expectations."
The statistical significance of differences in school-averaged scores, aside from their
reflection of community income, may not be not enough to compare schools reliably and
may not be enough to evaluate short-term changes in teaching and learning. Whatever
aspects of school performance these scores might measure can be lost in the fluctuations
for a particular school over any one year or few years. Only averages and trends in scores
over several years would be likely to yield statistically useful information.
Some observers question whether it is realistic to expect standardized tests to yield
significant information comparing school performance, even over a period of years (for
example, Rowe, 1999a, and Rowe, et al., 1999b). They argue that variations in student
achievement are commonly greater within schools than between schools. Others contend
that adaptive and defensive behavior encouraged by "high-stakes" political environments
grossly distorts outcomes from all types of educational assessment and robs them of
meaning (for example, Sacks, 1999, and Hayman, 1998). It is important to point out that
significance attributed to results in these studies is purely statistical. Neither these studies
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nor any others known to the author have shown that MCAS test scores have practical
significance, in the sense of predicting success in adult activities to any greater degree
than could be done with knowledge of student backgrounds.
Section 3: Results
A. Opportunities and Questions
In future work, it may be helpful to examine categories of metropolitan Boston schools
that were excluded from or specially identified in these studies:
Vocational, technical and agricultural schools
Academic schools that also provide vocational education
Pilot schools, charter schools, specialty schools and small schools
Other questions might be answered by extending data coverage:
Do other test scores yield similar results?
Do small class sizes have significant effects?
Does teacher preparation have significant effects?
Do math course enrollments have significant effects? (Note 13)
Can other factors be found that increase significance?
Are the same effects found in other Massachusetts schools?
Are similar effects observed in elementary and middle school grades?
Are the same or different patterns observed in other US metropolitan areas?
Can income factors be estimated for communities with multiple high schools?
If individual data were available, would multi-level analysis show different results?
The strong, linear relation found between school-averaged tenth-grade MCAS
mathematics test scores in a relatively calm year and community income in a previous
year, within ordinary ranges of incomes, leads to several questions. Does community
income primarily determine educational achievement, regardless of school performance?
Do MCAS and similar tests measure skills and knowledge that are acquired in schools, or
do they measure skills and knowledge that are largely acquired outside schools? Do
communities with substantially different incomes have substantially different expectations
for student performance on MCAS and similar tests? Is current community income also
strongly correlated with test scores? After a turbulent period of local efforts to raise
scores, will the correlation between income and scores remain as strong? Exploring and
understanding some of these issues will require a different approach.
B. Conclusions
Community income has been found strongly correlated with tenth-grade MCAS
mathematics test scores and associated more than 80 percent of the variance in
school-averaged 1999 scores for a sample of Boston-area communities. The influence of
community income was robust against several sets of model variables and cases.
Community income swamped the influence of the other social and school factors
examined. Once community income was included in models, other factors--including
percentages of students in disadvantaged populations, percentages receiving special
education, percentages eligible for free or reduced price lunch, percentages with limited
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English proficiency, school sizes, school spending levels, and property values--all failed
to associate substantial additional variance.
Large uncertainties in residuals of school-averaged scores, after subtracting predictions
based on community income, tend to make the scores ineffective for rating performance
of schools. Large uncertainties in year-to-year score changes tend to make the score
changes ineffective for measuring performance trends. In their present state, considered as
a means to rate the performance of public schools, tenth-grade MCAS mathematics tests
mainly appear to provide a complex and expensive way to estimate community income.
Appendix 1: Education Reform in Massachusetts
Massachusetts has experienced many education experiments and reforms over the past
few centuries. (Note 14) During the 1990s Massachusetts education reform was driven by 
the McDuffy school finance lawsuit (McDuffy, 1993), originally filed in 1978. In its 
McDuffy decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said that Massachusetts
funding disparities harmed the quality of education for some students, denying them
education to which they were constitutionally entitled. This June, 1993, decision was
widely anticipated. The Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 (Education 
Reform, 1993) was signed less than a week after the decision was released.
A group called the Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education, (Note 15) organized in 
1988 and led by the late John C. (Jack) Rennie, then CEO of the former Pacer Infotec,
Inc., of Burlington, MA, (now the AverStar division of Titan Corp., San Diego, CA), and
S. Paul Reville, then director of the Worcester Public Education Fund, wrote the reform
bill sponsored by the Education Committee of the legislature. In 1991 the Business
Alliance produced a document entitled Every Child a Winner. (Note 16) A story from the
May 2, 1993, Northwest edition of the Boston Globe quoted former Rep. Mark Roosevelt, 
then House Education Committee Chair, as saying that the House education reform bill
then pending "is essentially [the Business Alliance document]." In a publication of
MassINC, Rennie is quoted as saying, "We bought change" (Walser, 1997). Most of this 
work was carried out in secret. As late as December, 1992, then Lt. Gov. Cellucci was
calling on the Education Committee chairs, Sen. Thomas Birmingham of Chelsea and
Rep. Roosevelt of Beacon Hill, to disclose their bill (Howe, 1992). Almost all the
controversy generated by this legislation focused on its funding formulas. Until 1993, the
public had hardly any knowledge of its sweeping changes in school policy and regulation.
The following newspaper report was printed December 23, 1992 (Overdue, 1992):
"The bill also calls for higher student achievement and curriculum standards."
This was the most thorough description in mainstream news media from 1988 through
1992. The bill was released in an emergency legislative session of January 4-5, 1993, but
it failed to pass.
Soon after the bill became public, education and public interest groups began to react. As
reported in the Boston Globe on January 26, 1993, a coalition headed by Stephen Bing of
the Massachusetts Advocacy Center predicted major problems with the legislation,
including these (Ribadeneira, 1993):
The reform bill will institutionalize unfair teaching practices such as using tests to
track students into different ability levels.
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By substituting different certificates in place of the high school diploma, the bill
will contribute to the dropout problem rather than ameliorate it.
The legislation provides no mechanism for meaningful participation by parents or
students in the development of a remedial education plan nor any opportunity to
contest an inadequate plan.
Such objections were ignored. Neither the mainstream news media nor the Great and
General Court gave these or other educationally oriented issues further attention in 1993.
Rep. Thomas Finneran of Mattapan, then chair of the House Ways and Means Committee,
secretly inserted anti-abortion provisions in the bill, provoking a storm of protest (Howe, 
1993a). Other House controversy centered on a salary cap for teachers, which was
removed. Proposals for "school choice," charter schools and gambling revenues became
the focus of activity in the Senate. The bill quickly became a hodge-podge of added
provisions with no coordination. Many observers became skeptical about overall benefit.
Geoffrey Beckwith of the Massachusetts Municipal Association was quoted as saying, "It
certainly doesn't appear at this time that this bill will bring about any fundamental reform"
(Howe, 1993b). In February, 1993, the Supreme Judicial Court heard testimony in the
McDuffy case. In March, former Rep. Roosevelt began a (losing) campaign for Governor
(Lehigh, 1993, Howe, 1993c). In April, the Edison Project, a business corporation,
announced interest in privatizing Massachusetts schools (Nealon, 1993). By May, an 
impasse over "school choice" had developed, the then Senate President William Bulger of
Boston demanding it and the then House Speaker Charles Flaherty of Cambridge rejecting
it. At the time, the Business Alliance opposed the "school choice" and charter school
amendments (Taylor, 1993). However, another business group calling itself "CEOs for
Fundamental Change in Education" had appeared, dominated by banking and large
business interests and supported by the Pioneer Institute. It was actively promoting charter
schools and "school choice" through the Massachusetts Senate (Vennochi, 1993). After 
compromising with limits and delays on "school choice" and charter schools, the House
passed the bill through second reading June 2 and the Senate passed it June 3. The
Supreme Judicial Court released its McDuffy case decision June 15. Former Gov. William
Weld signed the Education Reform Act on June 18, 1993.
In seven years under the Education Reform Act, state aid to Massachusetts public schools
has grown from $1.3 billion to $3.0 billion per year, almost all the increase going to
communities with low household incomes. For example, Holyoke, a low-income
community, now receives over 90 percent of its school funding from the state, while
Brookline, a high-income community, receives only about 10 percent (Mass. DoE, 
2000e). In 1992, Holyoke spent less than 75 percent as much per student as Brookline, but
now it spends about 95 percent of what Brookline does (School reform, 1992). Still, the 
Act has tended to provide more of a windfall for Holyoke's taxpayers than for its public
school students.
Besides setting state commitments to equalize school funding, the Education Reform Act
made many changes to Massachusetts education policy and regulations, including the
following, as described by the Business Alliance (Taylor, 1993):
New goals, standards and indicators of performance for schools, students and
teachers
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Financial rewards to teachers and schools that excel
Decentralized authority, limiting school committees to policy-making and
oversight, making CEOs of superintendents, and giving hiring and firing power to
principals
Preschool for all 3- and 4-year-olds
Expanded professional development for teachers
More than seven years later, some of these changes are only starting to be implemented.
Before 1996, the Massachusetts Board of Education regarded test scores as only one
component of school accountability. In a 1993 policy advisory cited by Wheelock, 1999, 
the Board warned that an accountability system based primarily on test scores would be
likely to produce harmful long-term consequences, including: exclusion of weaker
students from the assessed pool of students; lowered morale among teachers and students;
the loss of experienced educators from schools enrolling many disadvantaged students;
distortion of instruction and curriculum to reflect test content and format; cheating and 
corruption of test scores.
Nevertheless the Board began development of testing programs to satisfy the provisions of
the Education Reform Act, which eventually became MCAS. It appointed committees of
educators and parents to help insure that tests were meaningful, fair and free from overt
forms of bias (French, 1998). From 1993 through 1996, Massachusetts invested more than
$2 million to support education reform study groups seeking ways to set high expectations
for students (Antonucci, 1997a).
By March of 1996 the Department of Education had completed a Common Core of
Learning (Mass. DoE, 1994), released six of seven planned curriculum frameworks based
on it, and begun the development of MCAS based on the frameworks. In addition, it had
announced plans (Mass. DoE, 1996a) to: award grants to school districts for assessment
activities such as portfolio development; hold statewide conferences on local assessment
strategies; publish examples of student work that meet the statewide standards so that
districts have a model of what to strive for; develop a bank of assessment exercises linked
to the curriculum frameworks for use by classroom teachers. All of these satisfy or
support provisions of the Education Reform Act.
Development of MCAS took a sharp turn away from public participation (Mass. DoE, 
1996b) after the appointment of John Silber as chair of the Massachusetts Board of
Education in November, 1995 (Pawlack-Seaman, 1996). In August, 1996, Silber, former
president of Boston University and an unsuccessful candidate for Governor, working with
then Gov. Weld, engineered replacement of the 17-member Board of Education, including
four African-Americans and Latinos, with a 9-member board, including several with ties
to school privatization and charter schools, only one African-American and no Latinos
(Jackson, 1996, Wong, 1996). At his first meeting with the Board, Silber said the
Education Reform Act's underlying principle that all students are capable of learning at
high levels was "rubbish" (Future, 1996). Responding to a demand for his resignation in
1997 he commented, "Some of the things that pass for learning disabilities used to be
called stupidity" (Pawlack-Seaman, 1997). Soon after the Board replacement, the
committees of educators and parents that had been formed to oversee curriculum
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frameworks, test development and other education reforms were disbanded (Antonucci, 
1997b).
In December, 1996, Silber proposed a two-track system (Avenoso, 1996) with a general 
diploma awarded for passing the GED, a test introduced during World War II by Everett
F. Lindquist, developer of the Iowa test series, and now administered by the American
Council on Education. An honors diploma would be awarded for high scores on the
Massachusetts test series. Silber was forced to abandon the plan in January, 1997, when
his personally chosen Board of Education refused to support it (Leung, 1997). However, a 
legacy of Silber's proposal remains, the view that MCAS should be aimed at the
exceptional student. In August, 1999, the Business Alliance revived the two-track concept
(Still, 1999) with a proposal to award general diplomas to students who satisfy "essential
requirements in English and math." The Business Alliance did not specify how this would
be administered, and the Department of Education and Board of Education still oppose the
concept. What they have done instead is to make a "competency determination" required
by the Education Reform Act for a high-school diploma depend on achieving relatively
low MCAS test scores, (Note 17) answering about 40 percent of the questions. (Note 18)
A "certificate of mastery," as specified by the Act, is to be awarded for much higher
scores, (Note 19) answering about 80 percent of the questions to achieve an "advanced"
rating on one or more tests.
After the loss of two Education Commissioners in rapid succession (Battenfield and 
Pressley, 1999), Silber resigned during a struggle over a new Commissioner in March,
1999. The outcome of the controversy (Estrin, 1999) was replacement of Silber by James 
Peyser (see Peyser, 1996, and Peyser, 1998), head of the reactionary Pioneer Institute, tied 
to school voucher and privatization movements, and retention of the compliant acting
Commissioner David Driscoll. Since the Silber era, MCAS development has been closely
monitored by Board of Education member Abigail Thernstrom, a fellow of the Manhattan
Institute, (Note 20) and hired consultant Sandra Stotsky (see Stotsky, 1999), a writer for 
the Fordham Foundation and now an Associate Commissioner of Education. Both of these
right-wing foundations have supported forms of school privatization. Four rounds of
MCAS tests have now been administered, in the spring of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001.
The Board of Education has made the questions used in scoring available to the public,
although they have not disclosed their standards for evaluating essay questions or all the
details of their approach to computing scores.(Note 21) Students in religious-run and other
private schools and students being taught at home are not required to take or pass MCAS
tests. Bills have been filed but have not been enacted to include private schools in testing
and to exclude charter schools. A system of "school accountability" has been defined by
the Department of Education (Mass. DoE, 1999b). It is based entirely on MCAS scores, a 
violation of Education Reform Act requirements. (Note 22)
MCAS has been heavily promoted by a business-oriented group organized as Mass Insight
Education and Research Institute, Inc., in Boston, founded in 1997 by registered
Massachusetts lobbyist William H. Guenther, who is its president. (Note 23) Guenther is
also involved with three other public relations organizations, Mass Insight Corp., in
Cambridge, Opinion Dynamics Corp., in Cambridge, and New England Economic
Project, in Walpole. Mass Insight Education and Research Institute is a non-profit
corporation that coordinates several policy groups and has close relationships with
business and education executives. Leaders of its "Campaign for Higher Standards" have
included Gloria Larson, former Mass. Secretary of Economic Affairs, the late John C.
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Rennie, former Chairman of the Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education and
Vice-Chairman of AverStar, Inc., and Cathy Minehan, President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston. Leaders of its "Coalition for Higher Standards" include James Caradonio,
Superintendent of Worcester Public Schools, and Thomas Payzant, Superintendent of
Boston Public Schools. Its board of directors has included Maura Banta, Manager for
External Programs at IBM Corporation, John Rennie, Abigail Thernstrom, Senior Fellow
at the Manhattan Institute and member of the Massachusetts Board of Education, and
Bruce Tobey, Mayor of Gloucester. Financial supporters of Mass Insight Education and
Research Institute include BankBoston (now FleetBoston Financial), State Street Corp.,
Bell Atlantic (now Verizon), Boston Edison (now an NSTAR division), Liberty Mutual
Group, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, AverStar, Inc. (now a
division of Titan Corp.), Gorton's Seafoods, Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Intel.
Mass Insight publications promoting MCAS have been distributed to public schools
through the Massachusetts Board of Education, (Note 24) and Mass Insight has received
public funds for its services. Mass Insight has been cited in minutes of the Board of
Education as a source of policy initiatives, (Note 25) including a proposal to use a score of
220 on tenth-grade language arts and mathematics tests as the initial "competency
determination" for high-school graduation, which was adopted by the Board in November,
1999. Mass Insight presents a simple but misleading picture of MCAS, saying that it
measures "skills that students will need after graduation―at college or on the job" (Why, 
1999). No such significance has ever been demonstrated for MCAS or other state
accountability tests.
Massachusetts schools are often castigated by newspapers and politicians as mediocre,
(Note 26) but actually they are superior. In the October, 1999, Boston Magazine, Jon 
Marcus wrote:
"According to assessment tests and other measures, Massachusetts schools
are among the nation's best. Students here rank fourth nationally in reading,
sixth in math, and eighth in science on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress, administered by the US Department of Education. They
scored higher this spring in reading than 69 percent of their peers across the
country on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills; a third of the state's third graders
were at the advanced level, compared to 19 percent nationwide. A Boston
College correlation of NAEP results with international tests found that in
eighth-grade science Massachusetts students performed as well as, or better
than, their counterparts in 40 out of 41 other countries, including Germany
and Japan; only kids in Singapore were rated higher. More students study
algebra and upper-level math and science than the national average, and
Massachusetts also has the fifth-lowest high school dropout rate, the nation's
highest percentage of graduates who enroll in college, and the third-highest
proportion of students who take the SAT. Massachusetts students' SAT
results have risen steadily since 1994; last year, they were the highest in a
decade." (From Marcus, 1999.)
Such a contrast between political bombast and educational reality has become common.
Part of the long record of declining SAT scores in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, had
a straightforward cause, the rapidly expanding number of students taking the tests,
including many low-income students and students with lower grades who would not have
taken them in prior years (Koretz, 1992, Berliner and Biddle, 1995, Berliner and Biddle, 
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1996). When education researchers looked at comparable groups of students, SAT scores
were gradually rising during much of this period; unadjusted averages began to rise as the
growth in the number of test takers slowed. With the gratuitous abuse regularly heaped on
public schools during this time, few members of the public would have guessed that some
of the real trends in scores were positive. Even now, many politicians and most news
media find the actual results inconvenient; they prefer simple, strident bashing of public
schools, uncomplicated by facts.
Many observers and columnists have commented on the complex language, mental tricks
and obscure bits of knowledge found in MCAS questions (see, for example, Vaishnav, 
2000, and Kohn, 2000). How elitist are the MCAS tests? One way to look at this is to ask
the fraction of questions that must be answered to pass them and the fraction of students
who cannot do this. Table A1-1 compares the current graduation level tests in
Massachusetts (Note 27) (10th grade MCAS) with those in New York (Note 28) (the
revised Regents series) and Texas (Note 29) (the TAAS series).
Table A1-1
Comparison of State Achievement Tests
State Typical percent of 
questions to pass
Typical percent of 
students failing (Note 30)
Texas 70 20
New York 55 20
Massachusetts 40 50
Source of data: see text, Appendix 1
Massachusetts, with by far the lowest passing score, has by far the highest rate of failure.
Yet year after year, nationwide measures of academic performance rate Massachusetts
students well ahead of those in New York and Texas. (Note 31) Passing an MCAS test 
says little about the education imparted through many years of schooling. On an MCAS
tenth-grade mathematics test, the difference between passing and failing can be getting 24
questions right rather than 23 (see Mass. DoE, 1999d, and Mass. DoE, 1999c).
A recent study performed by Catherine Horn and others at Boston College (Horn, et al., 
2000) showed that a barely passing score on the tenth-grade MCAS math test was
approximately equivalent to the 50th percentile score for the PSAT math test. Students
taking the PSAT are aiming for college. Many are taking the test as part of applying for
National Merit and other scholarships; they tend to be good students. Therefore it should
not be surprising when half or more of the general student population may "fail" the
current tenth-grade MCAS math test.
A large share of MCAS test questions is aimed at students with exceptional skills and
knowledge rather than at typical students. If Massachusetts designed tests to measure
competence rather than mastery, it would be setting much higher passing percentages. If
Massachusetts genuinely cared about assessing student skills and knowledge, it would
satisfy Education Reform Act requirements (Note 32) calling for a "variety of assessment 
instruments," including "consideration of work samples, projects and portfolios,"
facilitating "authentic and direct gauges of student performance," and it would provide for
circumstances of special education students, students entering the public schools from
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households that speak a first language other than standard English, (Note 33) and students
whose immediate aims focus on employment rather than higher education.
The Massachusetts Board of Education has ample access to information of this sort and
has received many recommendations to improve its practices and make its system of
assessments more realistic and fair. It has had more than $25 million to spend on
developing MCAS (Szechenyi, 1998). It is also well aware that "high-stakes" testing
systems in other states have sharply narrowed the school curriculum (Note 34) and 
increased the population of school dropouts, (Note 35) who are likely to be eligible only 
for the "McJobs" of the future. So far, however, members of the Massachusetts Board of
Education remain rigid, programmatic and hostile to facts that do not support their
policies. Their attitude does not originate from lack of information or resources.
MCAS, like the other "achievement tests" used in state accountability systems, has never
been shown to predict success in adult life to any greater degree than could be done with a
knowledge of student backgrounds. Instead of trying to show practical significance the
Board assumes it, in proposing to use this test as the sole state criterion to deny
high-school diplomas and state college eligibility to low-scoring students, making it
difficult for them to find responsible jobs and other forms of advancement. Students from
households that already have the least suffer the most from such a system, tending to
widen an economic gap between haves and have-nots in our society, already among the
greatest of the industrial nations.
Appendix 2: Massachusetts Vocational Schools
Massachusetts municipal school districts support either jointly or individually more than
30 "vocational," "vocational-technical," "technical," "agricultural-technical" and
"agricultural" high schools, (Note 36) most of which the Department of Education
recognizes as separate school districts. Table A2-1 includes the 29 vocational schools that
are now operated as separate school districts plus the "technical" high school operated by
the City of Boston. (Note 37)
Table A2-1
1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores for Vocational Schools
Vocational School 1999 MCAS math 10
Average Number
Assabet Valley Voc. High 211 186
Bay Path Reg. Voc. Tech. 210 245
Blackstone Valley School 213 209
Blue Hills Reg. Voc. Tech. 213 215
Bristol County Agr. High 212 100
Bristol Plymouth Voc. Tech. 208 207
Cape Cod Reg. Voc. Tech. High 214 171
Charles McCann Voc. Tech. 217 105
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Diman Reg. Voc. Tech. High 208 312
Essex Agr. & Tech. Inst. 212 80
Franklin County Tech. 214 115
Gr. Lowell Reg. Voc. Tech. 205 466
Gr. New Bedford Voc. Tech. 208 497
Greater Lawrence Tech. 205 320
Joseph Keefe Tech. High 208 160
Madison Park Tech. High 202 289
Minute Man Voc. Tech. High 216 199
Montachusett Voc. Tech. 210 257
Nashoba Valley Tech. High 208 121
Norfolk County Agr. 214 115
North Shore Tech. High 210 118
Northeast Metro. Reg. Voc. 206 297
Old Colony Reg. Voc. Tech. 210 127
Pathfinder Voc. Tech. 210 134
Shawsheen Valley Voc. Tech. 209 281
So. Shore Voc. Tech. High 212 130
Southeastern Reg. Voc. Tech. 209 302
Tri County Reg. Voc. Tech. 212 215
Upper Cape Cod Tech. 206 134
Whittier Reg. Voc. 204 352
Averages 210 215
Source of data: Mass. DoE, 2000h
Vocational schools typically provide instruction for grades 9 through 12 and devote about
half their instructional time to traditional academics and about half to vocational training.
Some communities, including Cambridge, Quincy, Revere and Waltham, provide
vocational education in the same facilities as academic programs. In contrast to academic
high school programs, which mainly concern themselves with preparing students for
college, vocational programs train students for specific occupations, and their faculty tend
to rate themselves according to graduates' success in finding satisfactory employment in
those occupations.
Vocational schools, represented through the Massachusetts Association of Vocational
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School Administrators, have presented the Massachusetts legislature with a bill to
decouple those schools from MCAS and substitute a special examination system based on
the occupational categories for which they provide training, sponsored by Sen. David
Magnani of Framingham (Magnani, 2000). They are well aware, as the foregoing table 
shows, that their students score far below state averages on MCAS tests; but they claim
that MCAS tests are directed toward a curriculum that they do not teach and cannot teach
without weakening their key programs. Table A2-2 identifies some of the major sources
of information for Massachusetts vocational schools available on the Internet.
Table A2-2
Massachusetts Vocational School Information Sources
Massachusetts Association of Vocational School Administrators
Bay Path Regional Vocational Technical High School, Charlton, MA
Blackstone Valley Regional Vocational Technical High School, Upton, MA
Bristol-Plymouth Regional Technical School District, Taunton, MA
Bluehills Regional Technical High School, Canton, MA
Diman Regional Vocational Technical High School, Fall River, MA
Greater Lowell Technical High School, Tyngsboro, MA
Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Technical High School, New Bedford, MA
Lower Pioneer Valley Educational Collaborative, East Longmeadow, MA
Minuteman Science-Technology High School, Lexington, MA
Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational School, Wakefield, MA
Old Colony Regional Vocational Technical High School, Rochester, MA
Shawsheen Valley Technical High School. Billerica, MA
Tri-County Regional Vocational Technical School District, Franklin, MA
William J. Dean Technical High School, Holyoke, MA
Whittier Regional Vocational Technical High School, Haverhill, MA
Worcester Vocational High School, Worcester, MA
Population trends at Massachusetts Regional Vocational School Districts
Source of data: Massachusetts Association of Vocational School Administrators
Appendix 3: Metropolitan Boston MCAS Mathematics Scores
Table A3-1
1999 MCAS Grade 10 Math Test Scores for Boston-area Schools
2000 1999 1998
City or
Town
High School Adj
Avg
Adj
Num
Adj
Avg
Adj
Num
Adj
Avg
Adj
Num
Arlington Arlington 239 231 234 246 230 251
Belmont Belmont 247 254 243 229 245 223
Boston Boston High 210 111 204 132 203 168
Boston Brighton 208 233 205 216 203 186
Boston Charlestown 210 175 206 148 207 156
Boston Dorchester 205 134 204 121 206 128
Boston East Boston 210 270 205 206 204 225
Boston Hyde Park 204 129 203 99 203 249
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Boston Jeremiah Burke 211 112 208 145 204 85
Boston South Boston 210 177 205 159 205 182
Boston The English
High
208 200 204 203 203 230
Boston West Roxbury 210 211 205 269 202 149
Boston Exam Boston Latin 262 382 254 399 246 417
Boston Exam Latin Academy 252 248 233 245 230 222
Boston Exam O'Bryant
Science
235 222 227 258 223 248
Braintree Braintree 241 319 228 306 229 324
Brookline Brookline 245 429 240 416 238 406
Cambridge Rindge & Latin* 219 331 220 423 222 404
Chelsea Chelsea 219 203 216 207 215 242
Dedham Dedham 238 180 227 174 226 172
Everett Everett* 218 325 221 295 216 277
Lexington Lexington 243 407 238 368 239 362
Lynn Classical 223 294 216 281 216 246
Lynn English 224 285 213 247 212 257
Malden Malden 225 305 221 286 219 265
Marblehead Marblehead 241 169 232 145 237 187
Medford Medford* 228 228 221 231 219 232
Melrose Melrose 228 214 226 245 225 243
Milton Milton 232 241 228 208 229 204
Newton North* 248 521 239 468 242 468
Newton South 252 309 242 285 240 282
Peabody Veterans* 226 426 220 354 219 372
Quincy North Quincy 234 301 227 303 224 294
Quincy Quincy* 220 238 212 200 214 279
Revere Revere* 224 251 218 306 216 286
Salem Salem* 224 234 220 243 219 257
Saugus Saugus 233 193 226 226 222 232
Somerville Somerville* 218 328 216 338 217 307
Stoneham Stoneham 235 171 227 169 233 171
Swampscott Swampscott 239 195 240 161 224 181
Wakefield Memorial 231 192 227 228 230 243
Waltham Waltham* 228 344 220 339 221 384
Watertown Watertown 233 164 231 159 221 156
Weymouth Weymouth* 227 466 222 455 222 433
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Winchester Winchester 249 225 243 198 244 178
Winthrop Winthrop* 227 120 223 118 218 162
Woburn Woburn 237 276 226 285 226 240
Source of data: see text, Appendix 3
Schools marked with asterisks (*) in Table A3-1 are those providing vocational education
in the same facility as academic programs.
Data in Table A3-1 are tenth-grade MCAS mathematics test scores for 1998-2000,
averaged by schools, and numbers of test participants per school, obtained from the
Massachusetts Department of Education (Mass. DoE, 2000h) and adjusted for percentages 
of students enrolled in schools but not taking the test. Adjustment formulas are as follows:
Nadj = N(1 - Pa/100 )
Sadj = (100S - 200Pa)/ (100 - Pa),
where
N is the number of enrolled students
S is the average score on test, per Department of
Education
Pa is the percentage of "absent" students (not taking
test)
Nadj is the adjusted number of students (number taking
test)
Sadj is the adjusted average score (only students taking
test)
This procedure cannot adjust correctly for students absent for some but not all test
sections. The Department has not published such information for the years 1998-2000.
Adjusted results are rounded to the nearest integer.
Appendix 4: Metropolitan Boston School Characteristics
Table A4-1
Data for Boston-area School Characteristics
City or
Town
High School Pop./
Grade
% 
African
Amer.
% 
Asian
or 
Pac. 
Isl.
% 
Hispanic/
Latino
% 
Lim.
Eng. 
Pr.
% 
Free
Lunch
9,10-11,12
Reduct.
Per
Cap.
Income
Arlington Arlington 259 6.7 4.3 2.7 0.7 8.1 0.2 21.4
Belmont Belmont 241 2.8 5.6 0.2 0.4 2.5 10.4 26.8
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Boston Boston 
High
183 56.5 3.3 26.5 14.4 64.3 4.0 15.6
Boston Brighton 267 49.5 7.9 35.1 32.0 62.1 29.4 15.6
Boston Charlestown 288 36.1 22.5 27.3 36.9 59.9 14.3 15.6
Boston Dorchester 249 66.7 2.7 25.7 29.7 51.4 26.2 15.6
Boston East Boston 317 24.0 6.7 40.3 29.8 62.9 47.0 15.6
Boston Hyde Park 220 72.0 1.6 18.4 23.5 53.6 15.7 15.6
Boston Jeremiah
Burke
176 86.0 3.6 26.1 32.9 56.7 20.0 15.6
Boston South 
Boston
267 46.7 18.4 16.6 26.1 44.6 24.3 15.6
Boston The English
High
332 50.1 1.9 36.9 45.5 62.0 24.2 15.6
Boston West 
Roxbury
328 64.7 2.4 21.1 28.7 64.3 18.8 15.6
Boston 
Exam
Boston 
Latin
398 18.5 22.7 8.4 0.6 29.3 16.2 15.6
Boston 
Exam
Latin 
Academy
255 27.7 20.2 7.7 2.8 40.0 28.3 15.6
Boston 
Exam
O'Bryant
Science
252 45.1 31.8 13.4 18.3 48.7 23.0 15.6
Braintree Braintree 337 3.6 3.0 1.0 0.4 4.2 12.0 18.6
Brookline Brookline 428 12.5 13.7 3.9 2.6 15.2 8.7 29.0
Cambridge Rindge &
Latin*
478 37.4 7.6 14.2 7.7 14.8 7.7 19.9
Chelsea Chelsea 281 8.5 10.9 63.7 15.1 57.8 39.1 11.6
Dedham Dedham 179 1.6 2.2 4.1 1.7 3.2 22.6 19.0
Everett Everett* 336 8.4 3.6 11.2 5.2 23.0 21.1 14.2
Lexington Lexington 386 7.3 15.0 0.6 1.1 3.9 12.3 30.7
Lynn Classical 282 17.5 24.0 14.2 14.6 38.8 26.5 13.0
Lynn English 327 11.3 14.2 23.0 20.1 23.2 20.5 13.0
Malden Malden 346 13.0 21.0 6.8 10.5 17.6 15.6 15.8
Marblehead Marblehead 178 3.9 0.7 0.6 1.1 3.5 -3.7 30.6
Medford Medford* 266 11.2 3.9 1.3 2.9 6.0 -1.7 16.9
Melrose Melrose 242 4.2 1.3 1.2 0.7 5.4 -2.9 20.2
Milton Milton 232 15.7 2.2 1.3 0.8 4.2 7.9 22.4
Newton North* 495 5.9 7.8 1.7 2.4 3.0 8.4 28.8
Newton South 300 3.8 11.1 1.0 1.9 1.6 8.2 28.8
Peabody Veterans* 418 0.8 1.2 7.5 2.0 8.4 20.0 17.0
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Quincy North 
Quincy
325 0.6 26.5 1.2 0.0 14.4 19.5 17.4
Quincy Quincy* 282 4.7 14.1 3.6 9.0 15.7 4.7 17.4
Revere Revere* 339 3.6 15.4 7.9 4.6 21.6 26.4 14.7
Salem Salem* 279 5.1 2.2 20.0 6.8 26.3 31.4 16.2
Saugus Saugus 221 0.7 1.9 0.7 0.0 7.9 17.2 17.8
Somerville Somerville* 467 17.1 5.9 14.3 15.4 52.8 24.6 15.2
Stoneham Stoneham 191 0.5 1.4 1.2 0.0 7.2 3.3 18.2
Swampscott Swampscott 184 1.5 0.3 1.6 1.4 2.8 4.0 25.6
Wakefield Memorial 240 1.9 1.5 0.4 0.1 5.8 5.7 19.0
Waltham Waltham* 381 9.0 7.1 15.1 3.4 15.9 -2.5 16.8
Watertown Watertown 184 3.7 3.4 4.2 3.1 14.2 6.1 20.4
Weymouth Weymouth* 464 2.1 1.8 1.0 0.1 6.3 16.8 18.4
Winchester Winchester 209 1.6 4.0 0.5 0.0 2.3 16.9 30.6
Winthrop Winthrop* 140 2.3 2.1 2.7 1.6 4.1 -12.9 17.9
Woburn Woburn 284 2.0 2.1 3.3 1.6 7.7 18.7 18.2
Source of data: see text, Appendix 4
Data in Table A4-1, except per-capita income, are gathered from the reports of public
schools to the Massachusetts Department of Education for the school year ended June 30,
1999, and published by the Department in its school profiles (Mass. DoE, 2000f). Data 
for per-capita community income in $1,000s are from the Massachusetts Department of
Revenue (Mass. DoR, 1999), based on the 1990 US Census of Population and Housing.
Schools marked with asterisks (*) are those providing vocational education in the same
facility as academic programs. All numbers except average student population per grade
and per-capita income are percents. Grade size reduction has been calculated as percent
decrease in the grades 11+12 school population as compared with grades 9+10. School
district reports (Mass DoE, 1999a) include the following: (Note 38)
Foundation Enrollment and Student Attendance Reports, reporting foundation enrollment
and student attendance as of October 1, submitted to the Department by each district no
later than December 15 during each school year.
Individual School Reports and School System Summary Reports, reporting on student
enrollments and classifications as of October 1, including gender, "racial" or "ethnic,"
limited English proficiency and low-income status, submitted to the Department by each
district no later than January 31 during each school year.
School Attending Children Report, counting all school-age residents of a district
classified by grade and type of school attended, as of January 1, submitted to the
Department by each district no later than April 30 during each school year.
Year-End School Indicator Reports, submitted to the Department by each district no later
than the August 15 following each school year.
End-of-Year Pupil and Financial Reports (EOYR), submitted to the Department by each
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district no later than the September 30 following each school year. An EOYR currently
consists of the following schedules:
  1. Revenue and Expenditure Summary 
  2. Assessments Received From Member Towns or Cities or Regional
School Districts 
  3. Instructional Services By Grade Level 
  4. Special Education Expenditures by Prototype 
  7. Pupil Transportation Reimbursement 
  8. Professional Development 
11. Pupil Membership Summary 
13. Staff Data By Major Program Area Instructional Programs 
16. Pupils-Attendance Data 
19. Annual School Budget
As of July 1, 2000, the Department requires school districts to compile data on
instructional costs at the school building level. New financial reporting will use a revised
and uniform chart of accounts in the EOYR due September 30, 2002. However, as
previously noted, current school profiles do not include expenditures for schools. The
Department has a long cycle for publication of data. Final summary data on per-pupil
expenditures for the school year ending June 30, 1999, were released January 20, 2001.
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Notes
1The terms "racial" and "ethnic" will be used here in the senses of state and federal
regulations, although they describe populations not always closely related by genetic or
cultural backgrounds.
2For the fall of 1997, 85 percent of Massachusetts elementary and secondary school
students were in public schools and 15 percent in private schools of all types. See
National Center, 2001, Tables 39 and 64.
3On the motion of Chairman John Silber, Mass. DoE, 1998a.
4Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 69 (Powers), Sections 1B and 1D. The
Department of Education publishes "curriculum frameworks" with only the legal status
of guidelines and recommendations. See Mass. DoE, 2000j.
5Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 69 (Powers), Section 1D, paragraph (i).
6See Mass. DoE, 2000i, Chapter 12, for procedures to equate scores across test series.
This document does not describe any procedures for relating test scores to education
content as delivered in Massachusetts public schools.
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7Model and MANOVA evaluations performed with Statistica, Version 5.5, StatSoft, 
Tulsa, OK.
8Compare "promoting power" or "holding power" in Balfanz and Legters, 2001. For 
issues concerning availability of accurate data on public school dropout rates, see
Kaufman, 2001.
9Other school characteristics also deserve consideration. Boston may have enrollment
patterns for high-school mathematics classes differing from suburban norms. Ninth-grade
students classified as "Asian" have been found more than twice as likely as average
students to be enrolled in traditional "high school mathematics" courses, while students
classified as "Hispanic" were found less likely than average to be taking such courses.
(Anne Wheelock, personal communication, January, 2001).
10It is possible that "limited English proficiency" acts as a proxy for other, potentially
stronger factors, much as certain "racial" or "ethnic" percentages appear to act as proxies
for income factors in these data.
11Other studies have reported significant "racial" or "ethnic" test score differences for
individuals after adjusting for incomes. For one survey and an evaluation, see Hedges 
and Nowell, 1998, pp. 149-181. However, few studies have considered school ratings
based on scholastic achievement tests given in the mid-teen years and have used
commensurate data for a geographical cluster of communities that were each fairly
homogeneous.
12See Mass. DoE, 1999b. For the first published ratings, see Mass. DoE, 2001. For 
potential penalties, see Mass. DoE, 2000b.
13See "Relationships between student MCAS performance and courses taken," in Brian
Gong, Relationships Between Student Performance on the MCAS and Other
Tests--Collaborating District A, National Center for the Improvement of Educational
Assessment, Inc., March, 1999, pp. 39-48, available at http://www.nciea.org/uploadCFA
/MA%20report.pdf.
14See Cremin, 1970, Kaestle, 1983, Tyack, 1974, and Tyack and Cuban, 1995.
15Referred to herein as the "Business Alliance." Not to be confused with the
Massachusetts Global Business Alliance, Business Education Alliance, Regional
Education and Business Alliance, or any of several other organizations with similar
names.
16See Mass. Business, 1991. Principal author of the sections dealing with school finance
was economist Edward Moskovitch, a former Massachusetts chief budget director and
executive director of the Massachusetts Municipal Association. The title of this
document should not be confused with the Every Child a Winner (ECAW) school
programs and educational games produced by Martha F. Owens and Susan B. Rockett,
beginning in 1974, and now distributed by Educational Excellence, Inc., of Ocilla, GA;
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there appears to be no connection; see http://www.ed.gov/pubs/EPTW/ep
tw9/eptw9b.html.
17
"Students in the graduating class of 2003 shall meet or exceed the...score of 220 on
both the English Language Arts and the Mathematics MCAS grade 10 tests...." See Mass. 
DoE, 1999f.
18See Mass. DoE, 1999c, Chapter 8, Scoring, and Chapter 10, Scaling.
19Mass. DoE, 2000a. Also see Mass DoE, 1998c, and Mass. DoE, 1999c.
20See Antonucci, 1995, for the following: "As students are better matched to their
institutions," [says Abigail Thernstrom], "as they cascade to places where they are
prepared to the average level, the graduation rates should go up for minorities."
21For most of the available information, see Mass DoE, 1999c.
22Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 69 (Powers), Section 1I (second paragraph). 
Also see Allen, 1999.
23Information on Mass Insight is available at http://www.massinsight.com/meri/index.
html.
24For example, a "Starting Now" brochure for parents. See Driscoll, 1998a, and Driscoll, 
1999b. The versions distributed include: Fall 1998, Spring 1999, Manufacturing and
Processing Industry Spotlight, Fall 1999, Spring 2000, Fall 2000 and Spring 2001--all
available from the Massachusetts Department of Education at
http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/p ubs/other_pub.html.
25See the following examples: "Recent survey by Mass Insight," cited in Goals 2000 
Five Year Master Plan, Goal 5, "Create a statewide infrastructure," March, 1995; "Mass
Insight report on education reform," minutes of March 22, 1996; presentations on the
graduation requirement by Bill Guenther, Mass Insight Education and by Susan Kiernan
and John Lozada, Mass Insight's Campaign for Higher Standards, minutes of November
23, 1999.
26
"A majority of parents surveyed said they would rather pay out of their pockets to send
their children to private or parochial schools than send them to Haverhill schools"
(quoted in Grodsky, 1999). "Almost every school system is loaded with incompetent
administrators" (John Silber, quoted in Drew and Suhler, 1998). "We should change the
teacher tenure law so we can dismiss incompetent teachers" (Lamar Alexander, former
Governor of Tennessee and US Secretary of Education, quoted in Patch and 
Wallace-Wells, 1998). "The dismissal of incompetent teachers is made almost
impossible in some communities by such over-zealous delirium on the part of good
people" (from Samuel P. Orth, the author of A History of Cleveland, in Orth, 1909).
27For passing scores, see Mass. DoE, 1999f, and Mass. DoE, 1999c, Chapter 8, Scoring,
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and Chapter 10, Scaling. For typical scores from 1998 and 1999, statewide, see, Mass.
1999e, Executive Summary.
28For passing scores, see NY DoE, 2000a. For typical scores from 1999, see NY DoE, 
2000b.
29For passing scores, see TX DoE, 2000a. For typical scores from 2000, see TX DoE, 
2000b.
30In some formats, New York and Texas report lower failure percentages because they
exclude some students or they include students who pass after multiple attempts.
31See, for example, National Assessment, 1998, and similar summary tables from other
years.
32Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 69 (Powers), Section 1I (second paragraph).
33See Madaus and Clarke, 1998.
34See McNeil, 2000, and Heubert and Hauser, 1999.
35See Clarke, et al., 2000, and Haney, 2000.
36As required by Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 74 (Vocational Education), 
Section 7, and Mass. DoE, 1997.
37Data from Mass. DoE, 2000h.
38Also see EdTech, Massachusetts Department of Education, at
http://www.doe.mass.edu/edtech.
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